# Security & Bounties

## Contents

* [Security Statement](#security-statement)
* [Ocean Safeguards](#ocean-safeguards)
* [Proteus Pool Safeguards](#proteus-pool-safeguards)
* [Bounties](#bounties)
* [On-Chain Monitoring](#monitoring)
* [Audits](#audits)
* [Legacy Audits (Shell v1)](#legacy-audits-shell-v1)

## Security Statement

The Shell Protocol team holds security as a top priority. Shell contracts are non-custodial, meaning NOBODY (not even the Shell DAO) is able to access the funds held in any of the core contracts. DeFi can be inherently risky and time is the ultimate test, so all new features are released with utmost care, communication, and appropriate incentives for users.

There are some safeguards in place to actively monitor security threats and to address unforeseen situations.

## Ocean Safeguards

The [Shell DAO](https://wiki.shellprotocol.io/shell-dao/overview) is able to transfer protocol revenue between wallets or change the protocol beneficiary wallet, as well as adjust Ocean unwrap fees.

However, NOBODY can manipulate or confiscate user assets (Shell is 100% non-custodial), freeze the protocol (users can always withdraw their assets at any time), or block new primitives or adapters from joining (anyone can build and deploy on Shell).

## Proteus Pool Safeguards

{% hint style="info" %}
The ShellMultiSig is a legacy wallet that was used for Shell v2 Proteus pools.
{% endhint %}

A pool's deployer can assign a wallet the ability to freeze the pool in case of an emergency. LPs may still withdraw their tokens, but swaps and deposits are disabled.

The Cowri Labs team controls a 2/3 multi-signature wallet, the ShellMultiSig, that can freeze trading on Proteus pools assigned to it.

`ShellMultiSig:` [`0x07F076e66782918c0110e34Ee7610B0d4eE02794`](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x07f076e66782918c0110e34ee7610b0d4ee02794#code)

A transaction submitted through the multisig can be in one of the following states: `Uninitialized`, `Pending`, `Queued`, `Executed`, or `Expired`. 


For normal transactions, any owner on the multisig can submit a transaction by calling `submitTransaction`. This puts the transaction into the `Pending` state, at which point it must be confirmed by two of three of the multisig owners. Owners can also revoke their confirmation by calling `revokeConfirmation`, but only while the transaction is in the `Pending` state. Once the required number of confirmations is reached, any owner can move the transaction into the `Queued` state by calling `queueTransaction`. At this point, the time lock countdown of two days begins. Once the time lock period has passed, any owner can execute the transaction by calling `executeTransaction`, moving it into the `Executed` state. Note that the transaction must be executed within a given grace period of three hours from when the time lock expires. If the transaction has not been executed by the end of this grace period, it will enter the `Expired` state and the entire process must be repeated by submitting a new transaction. There are two special cases of transactions, **freezing** and **unfreezing** a pool. 



To freeze a pool, any owner on the multisig can call the `freezePool` function and pass in the pool address. The pool will be frozen **immediately** following this transaction, no confirmations or transactions from other owners are required.



To unfreeze a pool, any owner on the multisig can call the `submitUnfreezePool` function and pass in the pool address. At this point, the unfreeze transaction is in the `Pending` state and requires two of three confirmations from multisig owners. Once the required number of confirmations is reached, the unfreeze transaction can be immediately executed by any owner by calling `executeTransaction` since there is no time lock delay for unfreezing a pool. Note that the one contingency in this case is that the grace period begins as soon as the transaction is initially submitted, meaning the unfreeze transaction must be confirmed and executed within three hours of being initially submitted.

## Bounties

Shell has a [bug bounty program](https://immunefi.com/bounty/shellprotocol/) on Immunefi. Please submit bugs there.

{% embed url="<https://immunefi.com/bounty/shellprotocol/>" %}

## On-Chain Monitoring

Shell conducts on-chain security monitoring with Forta. Anyone can [subscribe to updates from the Shell Forta bot](https://explorer.forta.network/bot/0x7f9afc392329ed5a473bcf304565adf9c2588ba4bc060f7d215519005b8303e3).

This bot tracks Shell transactions in which wrapping, unwrapping, swapping, depositing, or withdrawals occur over a threshold amount. If transactions occur with unusually high token amounts, the bot sends out an alert.

`Shell Forta bot:` [`0x7f9afc392329ed5a473bcf304565adf9c2588ba4bc060f7d215519005b8303e3`](https://explorer.forta.network/bot/0x7f9afc392329ed5a473bcf304565adf9c2588ba4bc060f7d215519005b8303e3)

## Audits

[January 5, 2024 by code4rena](https://code4rena.com/reports/2023-11-shellprotocol)

[October 4, 2023 by code4rena](https://code4rena.com/reports/2023-08-shell)

[September 27, 2022 by Trail of Bits](https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/ShellProtocolv2.pdf)

## Legacy Audits (Shell v1)

[June 2020 by Consensys Diligence](https://consensys.net/diligence/audits/2020/06/shell-protocol/)